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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 900444-CA
Priority No, 2

OPHELIA BUFORD,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1953 as amended).

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Amendment IV to the Constitution of the United States
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Article I, section 14 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden—Issuance
of warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the person or thing to be seized.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Was the evidence seized in violation of the United

States or Utah Constitutions as the result of material
misrepresentations in the affidavit?
a.

Did material misrepresentations in and omissions

from the affidavit in support of the search warrant
invalidate the warrant under the fourth amendment?
i.

Were material misrepresentations included in

the affidavit and material information omitted
therefrom?
ii.

Did the officers act intentionally or with a

reckless disregard for the truth in including material
false information or in omitting other material
information?
iii.

Absent the misrepresentations, did the

affidavit establish probable cause?
b.

Did material misrepresentations and omissions from

the affidavit invalidate the search warrant under
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution?
The standard of review for any factual
assessments underlying a determination that probable
cause existed is a "clearly erroneous" standard; the
conclusion that probable cause existed is a legal
conclusion, and a correction of the error standard
is applicable. See State v. Carter, Case No.
900303-CA slip op. at 14, fn. 8 (March 21, 1991).
2.

Should the two-prong Aauilar-Spinelli test be followed

when analyzing a search warrant affidavit under Article I,
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section 14 of the Utah Constitution, and, if so, did the affidavit
in this case fail to establish probable cause under the state
constitution?
The issue as to the appropriate analysis under
Article I, section 14 and the determination as to
whether probable cause was established are questions
of law; factual assessments underlying the
determination are subject to a clearly erroneous
standard. State v. Carter, slip op. at 14, fn. 8.
3.

Did the affidavit fail to state probable cause under

the Gates totality of the circumstances test?
The standard set forth under 2 above is
applicable to this issue.
4.

Does the good faith exception save the search under

either the fourth amendment or Article I, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution?
This issue presents a question of law for this
Court, and a correction of the error standard is
appropriate. Any underlying factual determinations
are given deference. See State v. Johnson. 771 P.2d
326 (Utah 1989); State v. Maurer. 770 P.2d 981 (Utah
1989).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
In an Information dated January 6, 1989, the State charged
Ophelia Buford with a single count of Possession of a Controlled
Substance with Intent to Distribute, a second degree felony.

On April 13, 1989, Ms. Buford filed a Motion to Suppress
all evidence seized in violation of her rights under the fourth and
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fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution.

R. 43-4. Following

an evidentiary hearing held on July 14 and August 22-23, 1989, the
trial court denied the motion.

R. 58, 83, 85, 86, 87-92, 210-3.

See Addendum A for copy of trial court's "Amended Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law."
After a jury trial held on June 7 and 8, 1990, a jury
convicted Ms. Buford as charged.

R. 114-6.

Judge Uno sentenced

Ms. Buford to serve one to fifteen years at the Utah State Prison.
R. 200.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On January 3, 1989, Salt Lake City police officer Donald
Zane Smith came in contact with a prostitute named Yolanda Rodriguez
("Yolanda") at 7th West and North Temple.

R. 234:8, 46, 47;

R. 229:6, 78. Officer Smith was assigned to the Metro Narcotics
Task Force and was in plain clothes and an undercover patrol car.
R. 234:8.

Officer Smith did not know Yolanda nor had he worked with

her in the past.

R. 234:47, R. 229:4.

was a police officer.

He did not tell her that he

R. 234:9.

The initial conversation between the officer and Yolanda
had to do with whether he wanted a "date"1; however, after Yolanda
had gotten into the officer's car, he informed her that he wanted to
buy some cocaine.

R. 234:8, 46, 47; R. 229:78.

1

Officer Smith testified that asking for a "date" "would
indicate that she was propositioning [him]." R. 234:47.
- 4

Yolanda was a cocaine addict who had been using cocaine
when she encountered Officer Smith.
44. 2

R. 229:4, 70; R. 230:6, 13,

She agreed to help him get some cocaine, and the pair went to

a house located at 474 North Grant Street (740 West).

R. 234:9, 48.

Outside the house, Officer Smith gave Ms. Rodriguez some
money to buy cocaine for him.

The serial numbers of the money were

not recorded and he did not search Yolanda prior to her entering the
house.

R. 234:9.
When Yolanda returned, she gave some cocaine to Officer

Smith.

R. 234:9; R. 229:8.

The officer could not recall whether he

then gave some to her; she testified that he gave her a portion for
her own use.

R. 229:85.

Officer Smith did not search Ms. Rodriguez

and did not know whether she still had the money he had given her.
R. 229:9.

Yolanda still did not know that Smith was a police

officer.
Officer Smith told Yolanda that he wanted to meet her and
purchase more drugs later that evening if the cocaine she provided
him was good.

R. 234:49.

Officer Smith then dropped Yolanda off,

probably on North Temple where he had first encountered her.
R. 234:49.
Later that evening, at about 10:00 p.m., Officer Smith,
along with Detectives Sayes and Dewitt, went back to the Winchell's

2

Although Officer Smith initially claimed that he did not
have time to observe whether Ms. Rodriguez was "strung out" or had
tracks on her arm, he did acknowledge that "most, if not all of the
prostitutes working on North Temple are addicted to drugs."
R. 234:48. Later, Officer Smith testified that Ms. Rodriguez did
not appear to be "strung out." R. 229:5.
- 5
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located at 8th West and North Temple, informed Yolanda that they
were police officers, and, according to Officer Smith, arrested her
based on the "unwitting" buy she had made earlier that evening.
R. 234:10.

After arresting Yolanda, Officer Smith discussed with

her the possibility of her cooperating with the officers in making a
controlled buy at the premises so that the officers could obtain a
search warrant.

R. 234:11.

Officer Smith told Yolanda that he

would speak to the county attorney's office on her behalf if she
would help him by making the controlled buy.
agreed to work with the officers.

R. 229:12.

Yolanda

R. 229:ll.3

During the hearing on the Motion to Suppress, Officer Smith
testified that Yolanda had told him she had dealt with Bobby and
Fifi, but that she made the unwitting buy from "Bobby," a large
black male.

R. 229:16; R. 234:11.

During the hearing, Officer Smith acknowledged that the
statement in the affidavit that Yolanda had bought drugs from Fifi
on each occasion was not true.

R. 229:17.

In somewhat confusing

testimony, he then indicated that he was testifying from memory, and
that although he had a specific recollection that she had told him
that she purchased the drugs from a large black male named "Bobby,"
the search warrant affidavit was prepared closer in time to the
incident and would be more accurate.

R. 229:18.

3

He acknowledged,

Yolanda claimed that the officers told her that they
would not arrest her for the unwitting buy if she cooperated with
them. R. 229:69. Officer Smith testified that he screened the case
which had been based on an unwitting buy with a deputy county
attorney and decided not to prosecute because Yolanda had
cooperated. R. 229:13.
- 6
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however, that Detective McCarthy prepared the affidavit while
Officer Smith was attempting to make a controlled buy at the
residence.

R. 229:49-50.

Officer Smith later testified that he knew that Yolanda had
told him that Bobby was present, but he was not sure whether she
stated that she made the transaction with him or Fifi.
42.

R. 229:21,

Later, the officer acknowledged that "Fifi" was not involved in

the controlled buy and that that portion of the affidavit was
incorrect.

R. 229:63.

Yolanda consistently testified that she told the officers
that she made the unwitting purchase from a big, tall black man.
R. 230:2; R. 229:80.

Yolanda also testified that she did not tell

the officers that she had purchased drugs from "Fifi," and she did
not in fact purchase drugs from "Fifi" during the unwitting buy or
in the past.

R. 229:75; R. 229:71, 81.

She testified further that

"Fifi" had not been present during the earlier transaction.
Although it would be a common question to ask an informant
whether he or she saw scales and other paraphernalia inside the
premises, Officer Smith could not recall whether he had asked
Yolanda such a question.

R. 229:21.

Officer Smith contacted other

officers with information about the residence who identified the
suspect known as Fifi as Ophelia Buford.

R. 234:14-51. He also

testified that he received information that drug transactions
occurred at the premises and that some of the people involved had
"aggravated criminal histories."

R. 234:15-6.
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After Officer Smith attempted to gather information about
the house, Detective McCarthy typed up a search warrant.
R. 229:49-50.

R. 234:17;

Officer Smith was the affiant; however, he was not

present while the search warrant was being put together, and did not
have an opportunity to review it at that time.

R. 234:17.

The

affidavit was prepared prior to any controlled buy being made and
included "facts" which anticipated what would occur during the
course of a "controlled buy."
After Officer Smith completed his interview of Yolanda, he
directed Officer Oman to search her.

R. 234:18-9, 41.

Such a

search is standard operating procedure for a "controlled buy," and
is done to insure that the person does not take in anything that can
later be used as evidence.

R. 2 34:42.

According to Yolanda, after the search, Officer Smith
picked up her gloves which contained a syringe, felt the syringe,
then gave the gloves and syringe back to her, thereby allowing her
to take her syringe into the house.

R. 230:35.

Officer Smith

denied that he knew that she had a syringe when she entered the
house for the "controlled" buy.

R. 229:24.

Officer Smith placed a transmitting device on Yolanda and
gave her two hundred dollars which had been photocopied.
R. 229:24.

He also took down the serial numbers of the bills.

R. 234:19.
Shortly after midnight on January 4, 1989, four officers in
two cars waited outside the residence while Yolanda went inside to
make a buy.

R. 234:20.

The officers listened to Yolanda talk with
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a man about the details of a drug transaction.
R. 229:25.

R. 234:22;

The male voice then began making statements which the

officers characterized as sexual advances to Yolanda.

R. 234:23.

The officers could not remember the exact statements made.
Eventually, Yolanda asked the officers for help through the
transmitter.

R. 234:24.

After the third or fourth request, the

officers ran towards the house, kicked the door in, and entered the
premises.

R. 234:24-5.

The officers initially went upstairs where they encountered
several people.

R. 234:28, 29; R. 229:35-6; R. 231:136.

defendant, Ophelia Buford, was one of those people.

The

R. 231:137.

Although the affidavit indicated that the officers observed cocaine
in plain view when they entered the upstairs room which was occupied
by Ms. Buford and several others, Officer Smith testified that he
did not notice any cocaine in plain view.

R. 229:36-7.4

After

securing the upper level, the officers went to the main floor where
they found Yolanda in a bathroom.

R. 234:28; R. 229:33. The

officers found a syringe in the bathroom with Yolanda; although
Officer Smith testified that Yolanda was frantic, he also stated
that he did not have time to observe whether she was high.
R. 229:34.
The officers had not yet located Bobby so they continued
their search downstairs.

R. 234:30-31.

4

In the basement, the

Officer Smith testified that he thought maybe someone
else had told him cocaine was on the nightstand in the room,
possibly Officer Sayes, but he was not sure. He himself did not see
any cocaine. R. 229:29-40.
- 9
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officers found a large black man (approximately six feet eight
inches, 260 pounds) whom they believed to be Bobby hiding under a
bed.

R. 234:30-1.
Officer Smith did not recall whether he got any of the buy

money back from Yolanda; he did not search her after the officers
entered the premises.
her.

R. 299:28.

Nor did he receive cocaine from

He testified that the buy money was eventually located in the

house.

R. 229:28.

Yolanda testified that no one searched her after

the aborted buy and that she kept the change from the transaction.
R. 230:37, 40.
Several officers secured the premises while Officer Smith
returned to the metro offices and assisted Detective McCarthy in the
final preparation of the search warrant affidavit.

R. 234:33.

The

officers attached an additional page three to the affidavit that
Detective McCcirthy had previously prepared.

R. 174, 177.

See

Addendum B for copy of affidavit, including additional page three.
Officer Smith testified that he attached the extra page because the
information in the affidavit indicating that a controlled buy had
been made was incorrect.

R. 229:35.

In the affidavit, Officer Smith referred to Yolanda as a
reliable informant even though he had not known or used her prior to
that night.

R. 229:3-4, 6.

He considered her reliable because:

I based that on my interview that I conducted with
her, subsequent to her arrest. We discussed former
persons that we had both dealt with, and, to some
degree, some investigations that are still ongoing.
To supplement that I had planned to make a
controlled buy on the premises.

- 10 -

R. 229:46.
After meeting with Detective McCarthy, Officer Smith went
to the residence of a circuit court judge and obtained a search
warrant at 1:40 a.m.5

R. 234:36. He then returned to the premises

and, along with other officers, conducted a search.

R. 234:40.

During the search, the officers found a T.V. tray in the
upstairs east bedroom which contained various items of drug
paraphernalia and an eighth of an ounce of cocaine.

R. 231:154-5.

In the closet of that same bedroom, the officers found a purse
containing cocaine, among other things.

R. 231:162, 165-6.

The

officers linked the purse to Ms. Buford through clothing and shoes
found in the closet, items found in the purse, and residency papers
found in the bedroom.

R. 231:160-1, 170-1.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The officer intentionally or with a reckless disregard for
the truth misrepresented material information in the search warrant
affidavit and intentionally omitted information therefrom.

When the

information is excised and omissions added, the affidavit fails to
establish probable cause, in violation of the fourth amendment.
Pursuant to Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution,
this Court should employ a distinct analysis from the federal fourth

5

The Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
contain a finding that the search warrant was presented and signed
at approximately 1:40 p.m. R. 212. This is clearly erroneous; the
search warrant was obtained in the middle of the night, at
1:40 a.m. R. 234:39-41. See Addendum A.
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amendment analysis when officers intentionally, recklessly or
negligently include material false information in a search warrant
affidavit or omit material information therefrom.

Under such

analysis, the search warrant should not be upheld where the officer
acted recklessly or intentionally.

Where the officer acted

negligently, the false information should be excised, and the
remaining information assessed under the two-prong Aquilar-Spinelli
test to determine whether the affidavit established probable cause.
In the present case, the affidavit fails under the Utah Constitution.
Pursuant to Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution,
the two-prong Aquilar-Spinelli test, rather than the Gates "totality
of the circumstances" test, should be utilized in assessing whether
an affidavit in support of a search warrant establishes probable
cause.

In this case, even if the false infomration is considered,

the affidavit did not establish probable cause under the two-prong
Aquilar-Spinelli test.
Applying the Gates test, the affidavit did not establish
probable cause under the fourth amendment.
The federal good faith exception does not save the search
because such exception is not applicable where officers
intentionally or recklessly misrepresent information in the
affidavit, or the facts alleged are insufficient to allow reasonable
reliance thereon.

A good faith exception should not exist under

Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution; the exclusionary
rule under the Utah Constitution is constitutionally generated and
not judicially created.

Even if there were a good faith exception
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under the Utah Constitution, the facts and circumstances of this
case do not fit within that exception.

ARGUMENT
POINT I: MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATIONS IN THE
SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT INVALIDATED THE SEARCH WARRANT
IN THIS CASE.
A. THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS INVALID UNDER THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION.
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
protects against unreasonable searches and seizures.
In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-6, 98 S.Ct. 2674,
57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), the United States Supreme Court held that a
defendant has the right to an evidentiary hearing where he or she
makes a preliminary showing that a false statement was intentionally
included in a search warrant affidavit, or was included with a
reckless disregard for the truth, and such false statement was
necessary to a finding of probable cause.

438 U.S. at 156.

At such hearing, if the defendant establishes by a
preponderance of the evidence that the false statement was
intentionally included, or included with a reckless disregard for
the truth, the false material must be excised from the affidavit and
the remaining information contained in the affidavit must be
reviewed for a determination as to whether it supports a finding of
probable cause.

If probable cause does not exist without the

excised material, the search warrant must be voided and the items
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seized under the warrant excluded "to the same extent as if probable
cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit."

Id.

In State v. Slowe, 728 P.2d 110 (Utah 1985), reh'g. denied
(1986), the Utah Supreme Court, citing Franks v. Delaware,
acknowledged that

,f

[f]alse statements in a probable cause affidavit

made knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly, can invalidate a
warrant issued in reliance thereon.
111.

[citation omitted]."

Id. at

In Slowe, the officers prepared the affidavit prior to a

transaction which was part of a "sting" operation.

The transaction

occurred as anticipated, and the statements in the affidavit were,
for the most part, accurate.

Although the Court indicated that it

did not condone the pre-preparation of search warrant affidavits, it
nevertheless upheld the warrant because "[t]he minor discrepancies
that did occur did not undermine the essential truth of the
allegations or rise to the level of knowingly, intentionally or
recklessly making a false statement."

Id. at 111.

Id. at 111-2.

In State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986), cert.
denied, 107 S.Ct. 1565, decided shortly after Slowe, the Utah
Supreme Court followed the fourth amendment analysis in Franks v.
Delaware but extended that analysis to include material omissions as
well as material misrepresentations.

In Nielsen, the officer swore

in the affidavit that a confidential informant ("C.I.") had given
him certain information; the officer also attested to the
informant's reliability based on prior transactions with the C.I.
At the preliminary hearing, the officer essentially reiterated the
statements in the affidavit.

Id. at 190.
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After the preliminary hearing, the State revealed that the
affiant did not know or have contact with the C.I. and had received
the information in the affidavit from another officer who had worked
with the confidential informant.

Id.

The Supreme Court determined that the State's contention
that the false statements were not made intentionally or with a
reckless disregard for the truth were "entirely unpersuasive."
Despite the intentional false statements made by the
officer in the affidavit in Nielsen, the Court upheld the search
warrant "under federal law" (Id. at 192) because the falsehood "was
not material to the magistrate's finding of probable cause."
191.

Id. at

See also State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363 (Utah App. 1987).

1. Material Misrepresentations Were Included in the
Affidavit and Material Information Was Omitted
Therefrom.
In the present case, the affidavit contained the following
falsehoods:
1. The statement in paragraph 7 on page two
that "RI told your affiant that each buy of cocaine
was made from Fifi . . . "
2. The statement in paragraph 5 on page two
that a controlled buy was made within the past eight
hours, as well as all statements relating to that
controlled buy.
Statements relating to the controlled buy are
as follows:
a. The RI was searched after the
controlled buy (paragraph 6).
b. "RI was found in possession of cocaine
after the buy and did not have the Metro Buy
Money." (paragraph 6)
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c. "Affiant believes that the Metro buy
money listed this warrant/affidavit will still
be on the premises. (paragraph 9 on page three)
d. Information that the controlled buy
was made from "Fifi."
A further misrepresentation and/or material omission in the
affidavit involved the officer's depiction of Yolanda as a "reliable
informant."

Although Officer Smith referred to Yolanda as a

reliable informant or "RI" at least fifteen times in the affidavit,
he neglected to inform the magistrate that neither he nor other
officers had met or used Yolanda prior to that night, that Yolanda
was a prostitute and drug addict who Officer Smith had met several
hours earlier when he approached her on the street and the pair
discussed a "date," and that Yolanda had been placed under arrest
for her role in the unwitting buy and told that the officers would
ask the prosecutor to dismiss the case if she cooperated.6
R. 229:4, 70; R. 234:8, 46, 47.
In the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the
trial court made the following findings regarding the falsehoods
listed above:
1. "The testimony adduced during the course
of the suppression hearing shows that an error may
exist to the extent that previous drug transactions
had taken place with the person later identified as
Bobbie Roots, rather than the defendant." R. 212.

6

None of the information known to Officer Smith about
Yolanda would lead to a conclusion that she was reliable.
Intentionally selecting that adjective to describe her without
supplying any underlying details served to mislead the magistrate as
to the source, reliability and veracity of the informant.
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2. "The affidavit was intended to encompass
the anticipated drug transaction interrupted later
that evening. Agent Smith reviewed the affidavit,
inserted additional information gleaned during the
course of securing the premises and wrote in the
affidavit that the anticipated drug transaction was
not completed." R. 212.
See Addendum A.

2. The Material Misrepresentations and Omissions
Were Made Intentionally or With a Reckless Disregard
for Their Truth.
In assessing the impact of the falsehood outlined in
number 1 above, the trial judge concluded that "even if the source
of the cocaine was erroneously identified, the error was neither
willfully represented or made with a reckless disregard for the
truth, and the remainder of the affidavit amply supports the finding
of probable cause."

R. 213. The trial judge did not discuss the

intent of the officers in including the other falsehood or in
excluding the specific facts regarding the officer's relationship
with the informant, nor did he determine whether probable cause
existed when the false information was removed or the omitted
information added.
The finding of the trial judge that "an error may exist" in
regard to the assertion that drugs were purchased from Fifi rather
than Bobby is correct; the evidence establishes that the informant
bought the drugs from Bobby and told the officers that Bobby was the
seller.

R. 229:16, 17, 18, 21, 42, 63, 80; R. 230:2; R. 234:11.
Contrary to the trial judge's conclusion that the

information that the buys were made from Fifi was neither willfully
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nor recklessly included, the facts of this case indicate that, at
the very least, the officer acted recklessly in presenting this
false information to the magistrate.
Officer Smith testified that Yolanda told him that she made
the unwitting buy from Bobby.

Although he attempted to "backpedal"

and rely on the recency of the affidavit, his memory indicated that
Yolanda had named Bobby as the seller.

R. 229:17, 18; R. 234:11.

Yolanda testified that she had purchased drugs from Bobby and not
from Fifi, and that she had told the officers that she purchased the
drugs from a large black man.

R. 230:2; R. 229:80.

Although Officer Smith claimed that he did not
intentionally or recklessly include falsehoods in the affidavit, an
assessment of the officer's mental state requires inquiry beyond the
officer's assertions.

As the Supreme Court pointed out in Nielsen,

A law enforcement officer must be aware not only of
the need for accuracy in the information provided to
a magistrate in support of an application for a
search warrant, but also of the absolute truthfulness
of any statements made under oath.
Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 191.

In the present case, Detective McCarthy

prepared the affidavit while Officer Smith was attempting to make a
controlled buy.

R. 229:49-50; R. 234:17.

Officer Smith, who had

conveyed the information from Yolanda to Detective McCarthy, then
reviewed the affidavit.

However, at that time, the officers had

already securcsd the house and were in a hurry to execute the
warrant.

They knew that Bobby, not Fifi, was involved in the

controlled buy and had, in fact, created the circumstance that
required the officers to prematurely enter the house.
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The

circumstances requiring entry and the manner in which the officers
apprehended Bobby should have emphasized Bobby's role in the
transactions and caused a police officer reading the affidavit for
accuracy to recognize the falsehood.

The nature of the falsehood

coupled with the manner in which the affidavit was prepared
demonstrates that, at the very least, the officers acted with a
reckless disregard for the truth in including this information.
The record also establishes that the statement that a
controlled buy was made along with statements referring to that
controlled buy were false.

A controlled buy was not made because

the attempted controlled buy was aborted when Yolanda called for
help and the officers burst into the house.

R. 234:24-5. Nor did

the officers search Yolanda after they secured the house.
R. 229:28.

Officer Smith could not remember whether he got any

money back, nor did he receive cocaine from her.

R. 229:28.

Yolanda testified that no one searched her after the attempted
controlled buy and that she ended up with change from the
transaction.

R. 229:37, 40. Without searching Yolanda, any

expectation of finding the money inside the house is not supported
by underlying facts, and merely a guess on the part of the officers.
Officer Smith appended an additional page three to the
affidavit in which he acknowledged:
Your affiant was unable to complete the controlled
buy that was mentioned earlier in this
warrant/affidavit.
R. 177. At the very least, the officer was reckless in not
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clarifying what portions of the affidavit were accurate.7
The additional page three did not point out that the
informant had not been searched and that the officers had no idea
whether she had cocaine in her possession, or still had the buy
money, or neither.

While the magistrate may well have understood

that the controlled buy had not been completed, the ramifications of
that failure are not as apparent.

The affidavit and addendum

suggest that even though the buy was aborted, it had progressed to
the point where the informant had purchased the drugs and had
possession of those drugs after the officers entered the house.

The

magistrate could also have understood from the affidavit that the
informant no longer had the money.
this false information.

The addendum failed to rectify

If this court were to permit an addendum

which indicates that information in the original affidavit is
incorrect, it should require that such an addendum clearly state the
information listed in the affidavit which was not correct, and
outline for the court what did in fact occur.
Although Officer Smith was acting hastily in finalizing the
search warrant affidavit, he nevertheless is required to review the
affidavit and make sure that it accurately reflects the facts known
to the officers.

In this case, the failure to clarify that the

7

This method of preparing a search warrant resulted in a
confusing document which is unclear as to what did or did not
happen. Although the Utah Supreme court upheld the warrant in SIowe
that was prepared prior to the events outlined in the affidavit, the
events in that case occurred as described. By contrast, in the
present case, the events did not occur as described and the
attachment did not clarify precisely what did occur.
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informant had not been searched and did not have drugs after the
aborted buy was, at the very least, a reckless presentation of false
information.

3. Probable Cause Did Not Exist Absent the
Misrepresentations.
Where false information is included in an affidavit either
intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the truth, Franks
requires that the false information be excised and the remainder of
the affidavit assessed for probable cause.

fl/

Probable cause7 is a

standard requiring the issuing magistrate to make a reasonable
determination whether 'there is a fair probability that contraband
or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place./M
State v, Dronebura. 781 P.2d 1303, 1304 (Utah App. 1989), citing
Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76
L.Ed.2d 527, reh/g. denied, 463 U.S. 1237, 104 S.Ct. 33, 77 L.Ed.2d
1453 (1983).
In Illinois v. Gates, the United States Supreme Court
abandoned the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test8 which had
previously been followed in evaluating a search warrant affidavit
based on an informant's tip, and embraced the broader "totality of
the circumstances" test.

8

The two-prong test evolved from Aauilar v. Texas. 378
U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), and Spinelli v.
United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969).
The two prongs are: (1) the affidavit must establish the basis of
the informant's knowledge, and (2) the affidavit must establish the
informant's veracity and reliability. See discussion infra at 32-5.
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The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make
a practical, common sense decision whether, given all
the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before
him, including the 'veracity1 and 'basis of
knowledge7 of persons supplying hearsay information,
there is a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place.
462 U.S. at 238-9 (citations omitted).
Utah has followed the United States Supreme Court in
embracing the more general "totality of the circumstances" test in
the fourth amendment context.

See State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258

(Utah 1983); State v. Droneburg, 781 P.2d at 1304; State v. Bailey,
675 P.2d 1203, 1205 (Utah 1984); State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 285 (Utah
App. 1990).

Although rigid compliance with the Aguilar-Spinelli

guidelines may not be required under Gates, compliance with those
guidelines may nevertheless "be necessary to make a sufficient basis
for probable cause."

Bailey, 675 P.2d at 12 05.

Depending on the circumstances, a showing of the
basis of knowledge and veracity or reliability of the
person providing the information for the warrant may
well be necessary to establish with a "fair
probability" that the evidence sought actually exists
and can be found where the informant says.
Id.
In State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 284, 286 (Utah App. 1990), this
Court stated:
Although the Aguilar-Spinelli guidelines are not to
be mechanically applied, they are useful even under
the totality of the circumstances test for
determining whether the facts establish probable
cause. The United States Supreme Court has stated
that veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge of
an informant "should be understood simply as closely
intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the
common sense practical question of whether there is
probable cause to believe that contraband or evidence
- 22 -

is located in a particular place." Gates, 462 U.S.
at 230, 103 S.Ct. at 2328; see [State v.] Hansen, 732
P.2d [127,] 130 (Utah 1987); Droneburg, 781 P.2d at
1306. (footnote omitted).
As this Court pointed out in Droneburg, 781 P.2d at 1306, the
veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge of
confidential informants . . . are still relevant
considerations, among others, in determining the
existence of probable cause under a 'totality-of-thecircumstances.' (citations omitted) Otherwise, a
court cannot determine whether the information was
obtained in the context of unreliable circumstances
such as casual rumor. (citation omitted)
In Droneburg, 781 P.2d at 1304, this Court also emphasized
the continuing need for the officer to include specific facts in a
search warrant affidavit so that a neutral magistrate can adequately
assess whether probable cause exits.
"The fourth amendment requires that when a search
warrant is issued on the basis of an affidavit, that
affidavit must contain specific facts sufficient to
support a determination by a neutral magistrate that
probable cause exists." (citation omitted) The
action of the magistrate, however, must not be "a
mere ratification of the bare conclusions of
others." (citation omitted) Otherwise, the
magistrate becomes only a "rubber stamp" for police,
abandoning the neutral and detached role which is "a
more reliable safeguard against improper searches
than the hurried judgment of a law enforcement
officer." (citation omitted)
Id.
Where an affidavit does not contain specific facts regarding
the veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge of the informant,
courts look to the specificity and quantity of details supplied by
the informant, along with the corroboration of such information by
police officers or the obtaining of additional information by police
officers in assessing whether probable cause exists.
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In Droneburg/

this Court held that the search warrant affidavit failed to
establish probable cause.

This Court pointed out that

,f

[n]either

the credibility of the informant nor the reliability of the
information was ever established."

Id. at 1306.

In addition, the

"quantity of information" was insufficient to establish probable
cause.
In State v. Bailey, the Supreme Court pointed out that
although the informant's tip in Gates came from an anonymous letter,
the affidavit was upheld because the informant supplied details as
to the drug dealers' mode of operation, and the officer corroborated
the information "in great detail" before obtaining a warrant.

675

P.2d at 1206.
In Bailey, the affidavit indicated that the informant had
"previously given truthful information to the police concerning the
existence of contraband" and "the reliability of the informant as
'boosted by the detail with which the informant described his
personal observation.'"

Bailey, 675 P.2d at 1206.

State v. Brown involved a tip from a citizen informant.
This Court pointed out that "[c]ourts view the testimony of citizen
informers with less rigid scrutiny than the testimony of police
informers.

(citation o m i t t e d ) . . . . This is because citizen

informers, unlike police informers, volunteer information out of
concern for the community and not for personal benefit."
P.2d at 286.

Brown, 798

Nevertheless, the informer in Brown identified

himself, gave details as to an incident in which he confronted
children leaving the house with baggies of marijuana, and described

- 24 -

the house and greenhouse in question in detail.

Officers then

verified as many of the details given by the informer as they could,
and independently observed and gained other facts.

Only then did

the officers obtain a warrant.
In the present case, although the affidavit refers to
Yolanda as a reliable informant or "RI" at least fifteen times, it
does not contain any details as to her veracity or reliability.

The

officer's mere conclusion that she is reliable is not sufficient.
Two items in the affidavit relate to the informant's basis
of knowledge.

First, the general statement that "RI has been inside

the premises and has made purchases of cocaine."

The dates or

number of such transactions is not set out, and the testimony of
Yolanda and Officer Smith is unclear as to whether she had been in
the premises before the unwitting buy.
Second, the statement contained in paragraph six on page two
which indicates that the informant went inside the premises on an
unwitting buy and returned in less than a minute and gave cocaine to
the officer.

Although the officer included a conclusory statement

that "the only possible source for the cocaine on each buy occasion
was the inside of the premises," such conclusion is not true since
the informant could have had the drugs on her person prior to
entering the premises for the unwitting transaction.

Furthermore,

such conclusion does not let the magistrate do his job.
The affidavit contains no details regarding any prior
purchases nor any specific information abut the occupants of the
house.

The officer's testimony establishes that Yolanda was not in
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fact a reliable informant, had never been used by a police officer,
and was a drug addict who was picked up on the street that night and
stood to benefit from cooperating with officers,9
When the false portions of this affidavit are excised, and
the omitted portions added, the remaining information fails to
establish probable cause.

B. THE SEARCH WARRANT AND SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT WERE
INVALID UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the person or thing to be seized.
It is well established that Utah is free to interpret
Article I, section 14 of its state constitution differently from the
fourth amendment to the United States Constitution.

See State v.

Sims, Case No. 890463-CA (March 15, 1991); State v. Larocco, 794
P.2d 460, 465-6 (Utah 1990); State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah
1988); State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986); State v. Laffertv,
749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988); State v. Hvah, 711 P.2d 264,

9

The information about Fifi's prior arrest is irrelevant
to a probable cause determination since the affidavit, when false
portions are excised, does not link the house or transactions to
Fifi. In addition, although the affidavit states that the RI
observed various items of paraphernalia inside the premises,
Yolanda's testimony contradicted that statement and the officer
could not remember whether she had told him that she saw such items
inside. He did testify, however, that including such an observation
in an affidavit is common practice.
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271-72 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring).
This Court and the Utah Supreme Court have acknowledged that
federal law under the fourth amendment has become "a labyrinth of
rules built upon a series of contradictory and confusing
rationalizations and distinctions" (Hyqh, 711 P.2d at 271-2) and
that in certain contexts, a distinct analysis under Article I,
section 14 of the Utah Constitution may be preferable to a fourth
amendment analysis.

Id., see also State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89, 95

n.7 (Utah App. 1987) (overruled); Id. at 103-5 (Billings, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
In Larocco, 794 P.2d at 465, the Supreme Court relied on
Article I, section 14 in deciding that "an officers opening a car
door to examine a VIN on a door jamb" constituted an unreasonable
search under the state constitution.

The Court recognized that

federal fourth amendment law, especially in the context of
automobile searches, "has been a source of much confusion among
judges, lawyers and police."

Jd. at 466. Although the Court

indicated that if it were deciding the case under federal law, it
"would hold that a search was conducted within the meaning of the
fourth amendment," it nevertheless reached its decision under the
state constitution.

The Court stated:

The time has come for this court, in applying an
automobile exception to the warrant requirement of
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, to
try to simplify, if possible, the search and seizure
rules so that they can be more easily followed by the
police and courts and, at the same time, provide the
public with consistent and predictable protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
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See also State v. Sims, Case No. 890463-CA (March 15, 1991)
(roadblock violates Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution).
Case law from Utah and other jurisdictions supports a
distinct analysis under Article I, section 14 where an officer
includes falsehoods in an affidavit.
In State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986), the Court
concluded that the falsehood contained in the affidavit was not
material and upheld the search warrant under the Franks fourth
amendment analysis.

The Court pointed out, however, that the

decision was not dispositive of how the issue might be resolved
under Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution.

The Court

acknowledged that "the federal law it has developed since Franks v.
Delaware is not entirely adequate" and that "[t]here is no stronger
argument for developing adequate remedies for violation of the state
and federal constitutional prohibitions on unreasonable searches and
seizures than the example of a police officer deliberately lying
under oath in order to obtain a search warrant."

Id. at 192-3.

Hence, an analysis under the Utah Constitution distinct from that in
Franks v. Delaware is appropriate where misrepresentations are
included in an affidavit in support of a search warrant or omitted
therefrom.10

10

In Franks, the defendant "conceded that if what is left
is sufficient to sustain probable cause, the inaccuracies are
irrelevant" and that if "the warrant affiant had no reason to
believe the information was false, there was no violation of the
Fourth Amendment." Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. at 172. Hence, the
issue of whether an intentional or reckless misrepresentation in an
affidavit invalidates the search warrant was not presented to the
high court.
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Where officers include falsehoods in a search warrant
affidavit, case law from other jurisdictions supports Ms. Buford's
argument that under the Utah Constitution (1) intentional
misrepresentations should invalidate the warrant regardless of
whether probable cause exists after the offensive portions are
excised, and (2) where an officer negligently includes falsehoods,
the falsehoods should be excised and the remainder of the affidavit
assessed for a determination as to whether probable cause exists.
See Moreau v. State, 588 P.2d 275 (Alaska 1978); State v. Malkin,
722 P.2d 943 (Alaska 1986); State v. Caldwell, 384 So.2d 431 (La.
1980); People v. Cook, 583 P.2d 130 (Cal. 1978).
Prior to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Franks v. Delaware, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out
that "[i]f the affiant intentionally makes false statements to
mislead a judicial officer on application for a warrant, these
falsehoods render the warrant invalid regardless of whether or not
such statements are material to establishing probable cause."
United States v. Hunt, 496 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1974); see also United
States v. Thomas, 489 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1974).
The Alaska Supreme Court has deviated from the decision in
Franks in interpreting its constitutional proscription against
unreasonable search and seizure.

See Moreau v. State, 588 P.2d 275

(Alaska 1978); State v. Malkin, 722 P.2d 943 (Alaska 1986).
State v. Malkin, the Court noted:
If, in fact, the police officer affiant intentionally
made the misstatements then the search warrant should
be invalidated whether or not probable cause would
remain from the affidavit after the misstatements
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In

were excised, A deliberate attempt to mislead a
judicial officer in a sworn affidavit deserves the
most severe deterrent sanction that the exclusionary
rule can provide. Further, the fact that the officer
has lied puts the credibility of the officer and of
the entire affidavit into doubt. (Citations omitted.)
Id. at 946 n.6.
The Louisiana Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion
that a warrant cannot "survive the intentional deception of a
magistrate by an affiant11 in State v. Caldwell, 384 So.2d 431 (La.
1980).
In People v. Cook, 583 P.2d 130 (Cal. 1978), the California
Supreme Court also determined that where deliberate falsehoods are
contained in an affidavit, the entire affidavit and search warrant
must be quashed.

The Court noted:

Contrciry to the case of negligent mistakes, excision
of deliberate falsehoods in an affidavit does not
leave the remaining allegations unaffected and hence
presumptively true. The fact that the misstatements
are intentional injects a new element into the
analysis, to wit, the doctrine that a witness
knowingly false in one part of his testimony is to be
distrusted in the whole.
Id. at 140.

The Court summed up that "although the court can excise

the intentionally false allegations it cannot presume the remainder
to be true.

Lacking a reliable factual basis in the affidavit, the

court has no alternative under settled constitutional principles but
to quash the warrant and exclude the product of search.
omitted.]"

[Citations

Id. at 141.

The Court pointed out that elimination of intentional
falsehoods is not enough since officers would have "everything to
gain and nothing to lose in strengthening an otherwise marginal
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affidavit by letting their intense dedication to duty blur the
distinction between fact and fantasy.

[Citations omitted.]"

Id.

The reasoning of the Alaska, Louisiana and California
courts, when read together with Nielsen should be adopted when
analyzing Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution.

Where an

officer intentionally includes false information in an affidavit or
includes such information with a reckless disregard for its truth,
the search warrant should be invalidated.

The fact that a

significant misrepresentation was included in an affidavit, despite
the officer's awareness of the necessity for accuracy (see State v.
Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 191), raises a question as to the reliability
and veracity of the information contained in the rest of the
affidavit.

Furthermore, officers who intentionally or recklessly

include falsehoods in an affidavit should realize that negative
repercussions will result from the use of such misrepresentations.
In the present case, where significant misrepresentations
along with material omissions as to the reliability of the informant
were included either intentionally or recklessly in the affidavit,
the entire affidavit becomes suspect.

Rather than attempting to

excise the many falsehoods and insert the omissions, this Court
should adopt the more straightforward approach that Article I,
section 14 requires that an affidavit be invalidated where an
officer intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the truth
swears to a material misrepresentation.
California courts have also held that where a
misrepresentation is negligently included in an affidavit, the
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misrepresentation must be excised and the affidavit reviewed for a
determination as to whether probable cause exists absent the false
statement.

See People v. Theodor, 501 P.2d 234 (Cal. 1972)

(modified on denial of reh'g.); People v. Cook, 583 P.2d 130 (Cal.
1978).
Including the false statements as to Yolanda's reliability
and the buys being made from Fifi was, at the very least, a
negligent act by officers.

Even if this Court determines that

Officer Smith was merely negligent in including the false
statements, it should nevertheless, under Article I, section 14 of
the Utah Constitution, excise the false statements and review the
remainder of the affidavit for probable cause.11
The affidavit absent the false statements, as set forth in
Point IA above, does not set forth sufficient facts for a finding of
probable cause and the search warrant should therefore be quashed
and the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant suppressed.

In

addition, the basis of knowledge (the first prong of the
Aauilar-Spinelli test) is not clear; furthermore, facts outlining
Yolanda's credibility or the reliability of the information are not
included in the affidavit.

Pursuant to Article I, section 14 of the

Utah Constitution, the illegally seized evidence should be
excluded.

See State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d at 471-3; Sims, slip op.

at 19.

11

As Ms. Buford sets forth more fully in Point II, infra
at 32, the appropriate analysis for whether probable cause exists
under Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution is the
two-prong Aguilar-Spinelli test.
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Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse her
conviction and remand the case for a new trial absent the illegally
seized evidence, or, in the alternative, dismissal.

POINT II: THE AFFIDAVIT FAILED TO ESTABLISH
PROBABLE CAUSE IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE I. SECTION 14
OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
As set forth in Point IB, supra at 26, appellate courts in
this State have interpreted, in various contexts, Article I,
section 14 of the Utah Constitution to provide greater protection
than the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution.

See

State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d at 465; State v. Sims, slip op. at 11.
Although this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have
embraced the totality of the circumstances test set forth in
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 212, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527
(1983), they have done so in a fourth amendment context.

See

State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127 (Utah 1987); State v. Bailev, 675 P.2d
1203 (Utah 1984); State v. Droneburq. 781 P.2d 1303 (Utah App.
1989).

Neither this Court nor the Supreme Court has addressed the

issue of whether the Aguilar-Spinelli12 two-prong test should be
applicable under the Utah Constitution.

12

The test was derived from the cases of Aauilar v.
Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), and
SPinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d
637 (1969). In Gates, the United States Supreme Court abandoned the
two-prong Aguilar-Spinelli test and embraced the more general
"totality of the circumstances" test.
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The two-prong Aquilar-Spinelli test requires that the
affidavit in support of a search warrant set forth:
(1) the basis of the informant's
knowledge, and
(2) facts establishing the credibility of
the informant or the reliability of the
information.
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. at 114; Spinelli v. United States, 398
U.S. at 413; Bailey, 675 P.2d at 1205.
Various reasons exist for embracing the Aquilar-Spinelli
test under the Utah Constitution rather than the more nebulous
"totality of the circumstances" test.
Requiring officers to set forth in the affidavit the
underlying facts and circumstances enhances the role of the neutral
and detached magistrate.

See State v. Jones. 706 P.2d 317, 322

(Alaska 1985); State v. Jackson, 688 P.2d 136, 139 (Wash. 1984);
Gates, 462 U.S. at 276 (Brennan, J. dissenting).

(The magistrate

must "make the proper independent judgment about the persuasiveness
of the facts relied upon by the officer.")
The two-prong test provides a more practical, workable test
than the more nebulous totality of the circumstances test, thereby
providing greater assurance that Article I, section 14 will not be
violated.

As the court pointed out in Jones, 706 P.2d at 322, the

Aquilar-Spinelli test did not "reduce[] probable cause to a neat,
artificial set of legal rules."
Rather, the two-pronged test provided a structure
for probable cause inquiries, and if not rigidly
applied, allowed sufficient room for assessment of
the unique facts of the particular case.
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Id, citing W. LaFave, Search and Seizure;

A Treatise on the Fourth

Amendment, § 3.3 at 136 (1984 Supp).
As Justice Brennan stated in his dissent in Gates, 103 S.Ct.
at 2357, 76 L.Ed.2d at 580:
Aauilar and Spinelli require the police to provide
magistrates with certain crucial information.
They also provide structure for magistrates7
probable cause inquiries. In so doing, Aauilar
and Spinelli preserve the role of magistrates as
independent arbiters of probable cause, insure
greater accuracy in probable cause determinations,
and advance the substantive value of precluding
findings of probable cause, and attendant
intrusions, based on anything less than
information from an honest or credible person who
has acquired his information in a reliable way.
Various state courts have adopted the Aguilar-Spinelli test
for analyzing search warrants under their state's constitution.
State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317; State v. Jackson, 688 P.2d 136;
State v. Kimbro, 496 A.2d 498 (Conn. 1985); Commonwealth v. Upton,
480 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. 1983); People v. Johnson, 488 N.E.2d 439 (NY
1985).

See generally Note, United States v. Leon and Illinois v.

Gates:

A Call for State Courts to Develop State Constitutional Law,

1987 U.111.L.Rev. 311 (1987); Ryan, Is the Two-Prong Test of
Aguilar-Spinelli Alive and Well in California?, 13 W.St.U.L.Rev. 45
(1985) .
Given the unique circumstances under which the Utah
Constitution was enacted, the preference for warrants under the Utah
Constitution (see State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d at 469-70), and the
more practical and workable guidelines of the Aguilar-Spinelli test,
this Court should apply that test in assessing search warrants under
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Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
In the present case, the affidavit fails to set forth facts
establishing either the credibility of the informant or the
reliability of the information, as required by the second prong of
the Aauilar-Spinelli test.

Instead, it relies on the officer's

conclusion that she was a reliable informant.

As a result, the

affidavit fails state probable cause under the Utah Constitution;
the remedy for this violation is exclusion of the evidence seized.
Moreover, the basis of the knowledge is one unwitting and
uncontrolled buy.
cause.

This is not sufficient to establish probable

The appropriate remedy where Article I, section 14 of the

Utah Constitution is violated is exclusion of the illegally seized
evidence.

State v. Laroccof 794 P. 2d at 472.

POINT III. THE AFFIDAVIT FAILED TO ESTABLISH
PROBABLE CAUSE UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT.
Pursuant to the fourth amendment, a search warrant affidavit
must outline facts which establish a fair probability under the
totality of circumstances that the evidence will be found in the
place to be searched.
462 U.S. at 238.

State v. Droneburg, 781 P.2d at 1304; Gates,

The two-prong Aquilar-Spinelli test is one

consideration under the Gates test.
1205.

State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d at

Where "[n]either the credibility of the informant nor the

reliability of the information is established and the quantity of
the information is minimal, probable cause is not established.
State v. Droneburg, 781 P.2d at 1304.
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In the present case, not only was the two-prong
Acruilar-Spinelli test not met, the quantity of information in the
affidavit was so minimal that it failed to outline probable cause.
The evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant should therefore
be suppressed.

POINT IV. "GOOD FAITH" DOES NOT SAVE THE WARRANT
UNDER EITHER THE UTAH OR UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION.
The issue of whether an officer relied in good faith on a
warrant "is subject to de novo determination" by the appellate
court.

State v. Rowe, 154 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 16 (Utah App. 1991),

citing United States v. Frietas, 800 F.2d 1451, 1454 (9th Cir. 1986).

A. THE FEDERAL GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION DOES NOT
APPLY IN THIS CASE.
The "good faith" exception to the probable cause requirement
under the fourth amendment which was created in United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), rehTg.
denied, 468 U.S. 1250, 105 S.Ct. 52, 82 L.Ed.2d 942 (1984), and its
companion case, Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 1045 S.Ct.
3424, 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984), does not permit the admission evidence
seized in this case.
The United States Supreme Court created the "good faith"
exception to allow the admission of evidence seized pursuant to a
search warrant which later proved to be defective where the
"officers acted in the objectively reasonable belief that their
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conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment."
918.

Leon, 468 U.S. at

While in some circumstances it is objectively reasonable to

believe that a search warrant is valid (see, e.g., Massachusetts v.
Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 989), the high court made it clear "that in
some circumstances the officer will have no reasonable grounds for
believing that the warrant was properly issued."

Id. at 922. The

Court pointed out:
Suppression therefore remains an appropriate
remedy if the magistrate or judge in issuing a
warrant was misled by information in an affidavit
that the affiant knew was false or would have
known was false except for his reckless disregard
of the truth. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154,
57 L.Ed.2d 667, 98 S.Ct. 2674 (1978).

Nor would an officer manifest objective good faith
in relying on a warrant based on an affidavit "so
lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render
official belief in its existence entirely
unreasonable." (Citations omitted.) Finally,
depending on the circumstances of the particular
case, a warrant may be so facially deficient—i.e.
in failing to particularize the place to be
searched or the things to be seized—that the
executing officers cannot presume it to be valid.
Id. at 923.
Furthermore, as this Court pointed out in State v. Rowe, 154
Utah Adv. Rep. at 16, citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 915, "[w]hen the
magistrate reviewing the affidavit in support of the search warrant
is not presented with sufficient facts to determine probable cause,
the warrant cannot be relied upon by searching officers."
In the present case, the officers intentionally or
recklessly included false information and failed to include facts
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sufficient to establish probable cause.

Reliance on the search

warrant was therefore not reasonable and the good faith exception
under the fourth amendment was not applicable.

B. A GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION SHOULD NOT EXIST UNDER
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
Neither this Court nor the Utah Supreme Court has decided
the issue of whether a good faith exception exists under Article I,
section 14 of the Utah Constitution.

See State v. Thompson, Case

No. 880181 (March 21, 1991) slip op. at 7-9; State v. Rowe, 154 Utah
Adv. Rep. at 16, 17-21.
In footnote 8 in State v. Rowe. 154 Utah Adv. Rep. at 21,
this Court noted that "neither the Utah Supreme Court nor this Court
has held that a parallel doctrine to the Leon exception would apply
in the context of Utah's exclusionary rule[]" and pointed out that
"[m]any state courts have determined that exclusionary rules
existing by virtue of state constitutional provisions are not
subject to a Leon-type 'good faith7 exception.

See, e.g., State v.

Marsala, 216 Conn. 150, 579 A.2d 58, 68 (1990); People v. Sundlina.
153 Mich. App. 277, 395 N.W.2d 308, 315 (1986), appeal denied 428
Mich. 887 (1987); State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 370 S.E.2d 553
(1988); State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 519 A.2d 820, 857 (1987);
People v. Bicrelow. 66 N.Y.2d 417, 488 N.Ed.2d 451, 457-8 (1985)."
Although in Thompson, the Supreme Court left "for another
day the issue of whether to apply inappropriate circumstances a good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule to Article I, section 14 of
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the Utah Constitution," (State v. Thompson, slip op. at 9 ) , it
pointed out in footnote 4 that H[t]he Supreme Court of Connecticut
recently held that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule
was incompatible with its constitution.
58 (1990)."

State v. Marsala, 579 A.2d

State v. Thompson, slip op. at 9.

Furthermore, an "Appendix" to the opinion in State v. Rowe,
154 Utah Adv. Rep. at 17-21, traces the history of the exclusionary
rule and the Leon "good faith" exception, concluding:
As and when the appellate courts of this
state are squarely confronted with the question of
whether the exclusionary rule existing by virtue
of Article I, Section 14, of the Utah Constitution
is subject to a Leon-type "good faith" exception,
a healthy skepticism should permeate the courts7
consideration in view of the troublesome analysis
in Leon.
State v. Rowe, 154 Utah Adv. Rep. at 20.
In his dissent in Leon, 468 U.S. at 928-960, Justice Brennan
traced the history of the exclusionary rule and outlined the
argument for rejecting a good faith exception under the fourth
amendment.

At the outset, he pointed out that the good faith

exception is premised on the idea that the exclusionary rule is "a
judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment
rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a
personal constitutional right."

468 U.S.at 931, citing 468 U.S. at

906, quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348, 94 S.Ct.
613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974).

Justice Brennan disagreed and

reiterated the position he outlined in United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. at 57 6-582, that the exclusionary rule is constitutionally
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generated and not judicially created and traces the history of that
rule in support of his position.
In State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d at 460, the Utah Supreme Court
acknowledged Justice Brennan's dissent in Calandra and expressly
left open the question of whether the exclusionary rule applicable
to Utah constitutional violations was a constitutional requirement.
Given the history and importance of the rule as well as the
troubling and confusing analysis federally, this Court should
determine that the exclusionary rule is mandated by the Utah
Constitution and is not merely a judicially created remedy.
Leon, 468 U.S. at 702, Brennan, J. dissenting.

See

The importance of

such a resolution is that if the exclusionary rule is
constitutionally mandated, a good faith exception cannot exist.
In addition to asserting that a good faith exception should
not exist under the Utah Constitution, Ms. Buford reiterates her
argument in Point IVA, supra at 36-38, that even if a good faith
exception exists under Article I, section 14, reliance on the
warrant in this case was not reasonable since the affidavit was
lacking in facts to support probable cause and misrepresentations
were intentionally or recklessly included in the affidavit.
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CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse her
conviction and remand this case for a new trial absent the illegally
seized evidence,
SUBMITTED this

^

day of April, 1991.

M

JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

V N,
^
JAMES C. BRADSHAW
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that eight copies of the
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400
Midtown Plazaf 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and
four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol,
J

Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this

day of April, 1991.

'foCu&fr
JOAN C. WATT

-
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DELIVERED by
this

day of April, 1991.
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ADDENDUM A

Third Judicial District
JAMES C. BRADSHAW, #3768
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

AU.G
J

6 1S90
D(*«4jty Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS

v.
OPHELIA BUFORD,

Case No. 891900113
JUDGE RAYMOND S. UNO

Defendant.
This matter having been heard before this Court on August
23 and 24, 1989, Defendant appearing in person and represented by
her counsel, James Bradshaw, esq., and the State appearing by and
through its counsel, B. Kent Morgan, Deputy Salt Lake County
Attorney; and the Court having heard testimony, reviewed the
memorandum of points and authorities submitted by respective
counsel, having carefully considering arguments presented, and being
otherwise fully advised in the premises, now enters its:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On January 4, 1989 at approximately 12:25 A.M., Metro

Narcotics Agents were monitoring conversation over a wireless
transmitter concealed on the person of a then confidential

00210

informant, Yolanda Rodriguez who was attmepting to make an
undercover purchase of cocaine from an individual later identified
as Bobbie Roots.

During the course of the transaction which was

occurring at a residence at 474 North 740 West, Salt Lake City,
Utah, Mr.

Roots made unwelcome sexual advances towards Ms.

Rodriguez which resulted in no less than three separate pleas for
help to the agents.

The narcotics agents called for back up and

determined to enter the residence when the cries for help were
accompanied by a banging sound which one of the agents described as
sounding as though Ms. Rodriguez had barricaded herself against a
door and someone was trying to get in.
2.

Upon forcibly entering the residence, several narcotics

agents dispersed throughout the three floors of the residence and
secured several individuals.

It was not until Bobbie Roots was

apprehended with some amount of struggle in the lowest floor of the
residence that Ms. Rodriguez finally was located in the bathroom on
the main floor.

On the upper floor of the residence, the defendant

and several other individuals were observed along with numerous
items of drug paraphernalia and what appeared to be a substantial
amount of cocaine on a table.

No items were moved or confiscated at

that time nor was any more than a cursory search made for
individuals who may have fled or posed a danger to the officers.
3.

Earlier that day, preparations for the affidavit in

support of a search warrant had begun as a result of an "unwitting
purchase of cocaine" by Ms. Rodriguez who had taken undercover Agent
-2-
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Zane Smith to the residence she represented as her source of
cocaine.

The information contained in the affidavit was obtained

from Ms. Rodriguez, other police officers and records maintained by
the State of Utah Bureau of Criminal Identification, Corrections,
and Metro Narcotics.

The affidavit was intended to encompass the

anticipated drug transaction interrupted later that evening.

Agent

Smith reviewed the affidavit, inserted additional information
gleaned during the course of securing the premises and wrote in the
affidavit that the anticipated drug transaction was not completed.
The testimony adduced during the course of the suppression hearing
shows that an error may exist to the extent that previous drug
transactions had taken place with the person later identified as
Bobbie Roots, rather than the defendant.
4.

The search warrant affidavit was presented and signed

at approximately 1:40 P.M. that evening and executed in reliance
upon that authorization resulting in the seizure of items sought to
be used as evidence against the defendant.
Having entered its Findings of Fact, the Court now enters
its:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Exigent circumstances existed justifying the

warrantless entry into the residence, and therefore the entry and
observations made during the search of the residence for individuals
was reasonable under the United States and Utah Constitutions.
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0021^

2.

Under the totality of the circumstances, the affidavit

in support of the search warrant constituted probable cause to
justify its issuance, and even if the source of the cocaine was
erroneously identified, the error was neither willfully represented
or made with reckless disregard for the truth, and the remainder of
the affidavit amply supports the finding of probable cause.
3.

The warrant was executed in good faith reliance upon

the authorization of the issuing magistrate which led to the items
sought to be used against the defendant as evidence.
Having entered its Conclusions of Law;
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's
Motion to Suppress is denied.
DATED this 6

yf

^ c i a y of Jas&ff 1990.
BY THE COURT: ix^n,M"

HONORABLE RAYMOND S. UNO
Third District Court Judge

DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of the Salt
Lake County Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, DT
this

84111

day of July, 1990.
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ADDENDUM B
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IN THE

ii AH

"A

THIRD

COURT

IN AND FOR THE SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

)

County of S a l e Lake

)

:

ss
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT

BEFORE:

TYRONE MEDLEY

,

JUDGE

2470 S o u t h R
ADDRESS

The u n d e r s i g n e d a f f i a n t b e i n g f i r s t duly sworn, d e p o s e s and s a y s :
That he/SSe^has reason to b e l i e v e
That
X£$ on t h e p e r s o n ( s ) of OPHELIA BUFQRD , 7 / 1 6 / 2 9 , F e m a l e
( ) i n t b * c h i c l e ( s ) d e s c r i b e d as

ig W e s t ,

the

Black

X^C^ on t h e p r e m i s e s known as
474 N o r t h 7 4 0 T J e s t . S a l t L a k e C i e v
a w h i t e i n c o l o r d u p l e x on t h e e a s t s i d e o f t h e o o a d f a c a p t on t h e S o u t h s i d e .

I n t h e C i t y of
S a l t Lake
, County of S a l t L a k e , S t a t e of U t a h ,
i s now c e r t a i n p r o p e r t y of e v i d e n c e d e s c r i b e d a s :
SEE ATTACHMENT

there

"A"

and t h a t s a i d p r o p e r t y o r e v i d e n c e :
£ 3 was u n l a w f u l l y a c q u i r e d o r i s u n l a w f u l l y p o s s e s s e d ;
fr.% has been used t o commit o r conceal a p u b l i c o f f e n s e ;
£ $ i s b e i n g p o s s e s s e d w i t h t h e purpose t o u s e i t as a means of
committing o r c o n c e a l i n g a p u b l i c o f f e n s e ;
£ 3 c o n s i s t s of an i t e m o r c o n s t i t u t e s e v i d e n c e of i l l e g a l conduct,
p o s s e s s e d by a p a r t y to the i l l e g a l c o n d u c t ;
( ) c o n s i s t s of an i t e m or c o n s t i t u t e s e v i d e n c e of i l l e g a l conduct,
p o s s e s s e d by a p e r s o n or e n t i t y not a p a r t y t o t h e i l l e g a l
conduct.
(Note r e q u i r e m e n t s of Utah Code A n n o t a t e d , 77-23-3(2))
A f f i a n t b e l i e v e s t h e p r o p e r t y a.nd evidence d e s c r i b e d above i s evidence of c h d L / O l ^ ^ :
c r i m e ( s ) of P o s s e s s i o n of C o n t r o l l e d S u b s t a n c e , P o s s e s s i o n W / I n t e n t

PAGE TWO
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT

The f a c t s to e s t a b l i s h the grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant are:
Your a f f i a n t D e t e c t i v e Zane S m i t h , RQ1, i s employed by t h e S a l t Lake
i t y P o l i c e D e p a r t m e n t , p r e s e n t l y a s s i g n e d t o t h e Metro N a r c o t i c s S t r i k e
^ c e . Your a f f i a n t h a s Been a p e a c e o f f i c e r
f o r 5 y e a r s and i s c e r t i .ed by t h e S t a t e TJtah a s a P e a c e O f f i c e r . Your a f f i a n t has been g i v e n
te r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o i n v e s t i g a t e n a r c o t i c s s a l e s and p o s s e s s i o n
offenses
O c c u r r i n g i n S a l t Lake County and t h e s u r r o u n d i n g a r e a s .
four a f f i a n t h a s had t r a i n i n g i n t h e n a r c o t i c s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and i n the
I n v e s t i g a t i o n of n a r c o t i c s r e l a t e d o f f e n s e s .
A f f i a n t has p e r s o n a l l y p u r c h a s e d v a r i o u s n a r c o t i c s on numerous o c c a s i o n s i n r e l a t i o n t o p o l i c e i n v e s t i g a t i o n s . A f f i a n t has been a s s i g n e d t o t h e Metro N a r c o t i c s S t r i k e Fore
Jfor 10 m o n t h s . A f f i a n t has worked w i t h o t h e r e x p e r i e n c e d o f f i c e r s i n t h i s
f i e l d and h a s s e r v e d numerous s e a r c h w a r r a n t s f o r t h e e v i d e n c e of n a r c o t i c s
[Offenses .
pur affiant is presently conducting a narcotics slaes investigation being
erated at the premisses described on this warrant/affidavit. Affiant has
xtfterviewed a reliable informant, Yolanda R .^ Rodriguez y hereinafter referred to as RI ^
^
^

f^RI tolf your affiant that cocaine is being jsold from the premisses named
ar J described on this warrant/affidavit. RI has been inside the premisses
av_ 'has made/^u^j^se>^ of coaine. RI has observed drug paraphernalia inside
the premisses "to^Lnclu'cle a set of scales, vials for cooking cocaine, (crack),1
pipes, razor blades and paper bindles pre-made and evidence of drug possession and distribution listed on this warrant/affidavit.
RI has cooperated with your affiant and has made one unwitting buy and one/ :
controlled buy both, within the last-.S Hours from the premisses listed on
h^^f
this warrant/affidavit. RI has also cooperated with vour affiant by pro- / i^A C
Yjjj 1 n g - ^ 4 1 -fripnMcy jn_ the form of name, date of birth, and home address/
During^ the unwitting buy of cocaine RI was given Metro Buy Honey after
[deriving RI .Cg Khf> nrPTn-fgP listed and observed entering then exiting, Jin
TTess than 1 minute and return to your affiant with cocaine. During the
*c"ontrol!led buy the RI was searched before and after the buy. The RI was gi^
ven Metro Narcotics- Buy Money listed in attachment A prior to the buy. The
Ri was found in possession of cocaine after the buy and did not have the
Metro Buy Money. The RI was kept under constant surveillance as the RI
approached and returned from the premises. Based on affiant's observations
and surveillance, the only possible source for the cocaine on each buy
occasion was the inside of the premises named and described on this warrant/
affidavit .
RI has told your affiant that each buy of cocaine was made from FIFI while
inside the premises listed on rhis warrant/affidavit. Your affiant has been
able to identify suspect FIFI from Metro Det. McCarthy. Your affiant was
informed by Det. McCarthy that FIFI was identified by past narcotics sales
and attached is copy of suspects prior arrest, to include priors for possession of controlled substance with intent to distribute cocaine as well as
arrest for carrying a concealed weapon and carrying a prohibited weapon.
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PAGE THREE
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
f i a n t h a s a l s o r e c e i v e d a copy of a p r i n t o u t i n which s u s p e c t OPHELIA
Wvi
CJFOR i s shown t o be on p r o b a t i o n f o r D i s t . Drugs For V a l u e , a l s o a t t a c h e d
A f f i a n t b e l i e v e s t h a t the Metro buy money l i s t e d on t h i s w a r r a n t / a f f i d a v i t
w i l l s t i l l be on t h e o r e m i s e s . Based on a f f i a n t ' s t r a i n i n g and e x p e r i e n c e ,
a f f i a n t s b e l i e v e s s u s p e c t s keep c a s h on hand w h i c h i s f r u i t s of t h e i r c r i m e s
and i s u s e d t o make change d u r i n g t r a n s a c t i o n s and to m a i n t a i n s such an e n t e r prise.
A f f i a n t b e l i e v e s t h a t c o c a i n e and m a t e r i a l s f o r p a c k a s i n g c o c a i n e w i l l be
found on t h e p r e m i s e s . On each o c c a s i o n s p e c i f i c amounts were asked f o r w i t h
o u t RI c o n t a c t i n g t h e s u s p e c t p r i o r t o a r r i v i n g a t t h e p r e m i s e s l i s t e d . RI
a l s o h a s t o l d your a f f i a n t t h a t RI has o b s e r v e d pre-made b i n d l e s w h i l e i n s i d e
t h e p r e m i s e s l i s t e d . RI has a l s o t o l d your a f f i a n t t h a t s u s D e c t has s c a l e s
i n s i d e t h e p r e m i s e s , your a f f i a n t r e c o g n i z e s s c a l e s as an i n h e r e n t Dart of a
drug s a l e s o p e r a t i o n ; they are n e c e s s a r y t o m a i n t a i n and conduct such an
operat ion.
A f f i a n t b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e p r e m i s e s s h o u l d a l s o be s e a r c h e d for n a r c o t i c s
t r a n s a c t i o n s , r e c o r d s , p e r s o n a l n o t a t i o n s d e s c r i b i n g amounts s o l d , d a t e s
s o l d , t o whom d r u g s were s o l d and drug i n d e b t n e s s . Such r e c o r d s have been
f o u n d on a l m o s t a l l o c c a s i o n s where your a f f i a n t and o t h e r o f f i c e r s have
s e r v e d n a r c o t i c s s e a r c h w a r r a n t s . A f f i a n t b e l i e v e s from h i s e x p e r i e n c e and
t r a i n i n g t h a t s u c h r e c o r d d w i l l be p r e s e n t on t h e p r e m i s e s named on t h i s
warrant/affidavit.
RI h a s a l s o t o l d your a f f i a n t t h a t RI h a s o b s e r v e d s u s n e c t BUFORD with
what a p p e a r e d t o be . 3 8 c a l Smith and W e s s o n , a s r e c e n t l y as two days a g o .
Your affiant considers the information received from the confidential informant
r e l i a b l e because ( i f any information i s obtained from an unnamed source.)
See Body of

Affidavit

Your affiant has verified the above information from the confidential informant
to be correct and accurate through the following independent investigation:

C0176

•/HUEE CONTINUED
/AYXT o* SEARCH: WARRANT
jr affiant was attempting to complete the controlled buy aforementioned
% this warrant/affidavit on 1/4/89 at approximately 0025hrs at the address
.isted on this warrant/affidavit. During the control buy your affiant was
monitoring the RI with body bug transmitter when your affiant and Det.
DeWitt heard the RI call for hfilp at least three times. Tour affiant also
could hear what sounded like a male person attempt to direct the RI into
a section of the premises that the RI did not want to go. Seconds later
your affiint and Det DeWitt could hear loud tumultuous banging sounds
that affiant and Det DeWitt perceliu4->Ajs an assault the RI. Entry was made
by your affiant and Det DeW«&4rfe^^e^iirgffr^ the safety of the RI, your
affiant jiaving knowledge of y^^po^otiens~gajby one flf P H * ftn^P^-p^fiTire
erit^rv yas-a-^iir and "Trgr^cf'&s" iJslda fftA p r o ^ n n g .«gfl»pnrf fnr pff^er safety
found in plain view was, _l/8 VO-T^'P ftf rmn^t\xie on a nightstand inside CI
4gain bedroom
u p j s c a i r s > Also youif a f f i a n t o b s e r v e d i n p l a i n view two p i p e s
w h i c h a p p e a r e d t o hav^s^been" used^Jj>r^smoking c o c a i n e i n t h e same bedroom.

£
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Your a f f i a n t was u n a b l e to complete t h e c o n t r o l l e d
e a r l i e r in t h i s w a r r a n t / a f f i d a v i t .

buy t h a t was mentioned

COI77

/CENT "A"
,lne, a white crystalline powder, a controlled substance, cocaine parayrnalia, to include but not limited to: milk sugar, baking soda, scales,
/d other weighing devices used for measuring weights, paper bindles, plastic bags, spoons, syringes, short straws, mirrors, razor blades, pipes for
Smoking cocaine in varied sizes and shapes and other instrumentalities used
for ingestion and sales of cocaine.
Articles of personal property to include but not limited to items of personal property to establish the identity of persons in control of the premises,
storage areas and containers being searched including utility company receipts, rent receipts, addressed envelopes and keys.
Articles jf personal property tending to establish and document sales of
cocaine consisting of buyer lists, recordations of sales, to include amounts
purchased and indebtness owed by other purchasers of cocaine.
U.S. Currency, Metro Narcotics Buy Money herein listed by denomination and
serial nunbers;
5100.00
B92133820B
$100.00
A0I516977A
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